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State Court Enforcement of Restrictions Achieving
Racial Segregation
There is disharmony in the Democratic Party as a result of the
stand taken by the President on omnibus Civil Rights legislation.
Such dissension is a manifestation of the struggle between racial
and religious minorities who feel that fundamental rights long de-
nied them should receive active governmental recognition and those
evanescent groups who believe that American traditions are being
attacked unjustifiably by persons indifferent to the general welfare
of the nation. The hue and cry raised by the more vociferous of the
citizenry is likely to bewilder the average man and certainly tends
to obscure the issues. But in any event, the turbulence provided an
excellent backdrop for decisions from the Supreme Court of the
United States concerning validity of judicially enforced restrictions
achieving racial segregation.
Among those cases recently considered by the Supreme Court is
Sipes v. McGhee,' wherein the plaintiffs, owners and occupants of
properties encumbered by a properly recorded agreement forbid-
ding use or occupancy of such properties by any person not of the
Caucasian race, successfully sought a state court decree enforcing
the restriction against colored occupants of neighboring properties
similarly encumbered. The covenant was found not void for un-
certainty, not void as against public policy,2 and not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution of Michigan. Nor was judicial
enforcement of the restriction found to be state action within the
purview of the due process 3 and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The court stated that to accept such reasoning with regard to the
latter clause would be to deny to plaintiffs the equal protection of
the laws by preventing the enforcement of their private contracts.
The submission of amicus curiae briefs4 was commented upon, but
the decision was confined to matters within the record and questions
raised in the briefs of the parties to the action.
In the companion case 5 in which the Supreme Court granted
1316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804
(1947), Notes, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 193 (1947), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 385 (1947).
2 Citing Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922), one
of the older leading cases.
3 The court here relied on the oft-cited Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926), but recognized the fact that it is not squarely in point.
Such briefs were submitted by American Jewish Congress (Detroit
Section); Wolverine Bar Association; National Lawyers Guild (Detroit
Chapter); United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Workers (C.I.O.);
Ardmore Association, Inc.; and the National Bar Association.
5 Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (1946), cert. granted,
331 U.S. 803 (1947), Note, 15 U. oF Cmn. L. REv. 193 (1947).
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certiorari, a similar restriction against the use or occupancy of resi-
dential property by people of the Negro or Mongolian race was
upheld by the highest court of Missouri as one which the parties to
the agreement had the right to make and which was not contrary
to public policy. Corrigan v. Buckley 6 was again invoked to dispose
of the constitutional arguments, with the further comment that to
deny court enforcement of the agreement would be to deny to the
cov.enanting parties one of the fundamental privileges of citizenship,
access to the courts. The court expressed concern for the over-
crowded conditions existing in the Negro sections of St. Louis but
indicated that alleviation of the situation was not the function of
the courts, particularly where a case involved determination of
contractual rights between parties to a law suit.
A recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision upheld a restriction in
a deed against the use or occupancy of the land by a non-Caucasian.'
The determination by the trial court of the validity of that portion
of the covenant prohibiting sale to non-Caucasians was held im-
proper since no sale by defendant church was threatened. Further-
more, the defendant church, as a corporation, was an entity separate
and distinct from its membership which was preponderantly Negro
and therefore lacked racial identity. The restriction against user
was compared to provisions forbidding sale of liquor on the premises
by a grantee or requiring adherence to building requirements., The
concept of individual contract received the favorable attention ac-
corded it in most cases of this type, and the public policy argument
was evidently disposed of in that portion of the opinion. No viola-
tion of constitutional provisions, state or federal, was foundY
In 1917, in Buchanan v. Warley,10 the U. S. Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a city ordinance forbidding any white person or
any Negro to move into and occupy any house in a city block where
a majority of the houses were already occupied by persons of the
other race as a deprivation by the state of the property owner's
right to dispose of the property to whomsoever he wishes. Such
6271 U.S. 323 (1926).
, Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, 79 Ohio
App. 457, 70 N.E. 2d 487 '(1946), appeal dismissed, 72 N.E. 2d 97 (1947);
cert. granted, judgment rev'd, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 3337 (U.S. May 11, 1948).
Notes, 15 U. or CHL L. REv. 193 (1947), 17 U. oF CiN. L. REv. 77 (1948).
Amicus curiae briefs were presented by American Civil Liberties Union;
the Asst. Pros. Atty.; Columbus Council for Democracy; the Eastwood Civic
Ass'n. and three other like organizations .
sThe court argued that no one would question the validity of a re-
strictive covenant against permitting a property "to be occupied and used
as a house of prostitution." The court failed to correlate this statement to
the racial problem.
9 Relying on Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
30 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
[Vol. 9
COMMENTS
legislative action is forbidden by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thereupon, white landowners resorted to
agreements, conditions, and covenants in deeds to exclude non-
Caucasians from purchasing or occupying residential property, for
the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private contracts.1 '
Restrictions against use or occupancy by non-Caucasians have fre-
quently been upheld.12  When such restrictions are broken, the
usual form of relief sought is the equity injunction which, backed
by the contempt power, evicts the non-Caucasian occupant. How-
ever, judicial aid has been withheld if the character of the restricted
area or of the neighborhood has so changed that to grant enforce-
ment would be inequitable. 3 Some jurisdictions recognized restric-
tions against sale to non-Caucasians. 4 But such a restriction has
been held invalid as violative of the property rule against restraints
on alienation.5
That state judicial action is state action within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment was established as early as 1883 in the
Civil Rights Cases,16 and the proposition has been reaffirmed in re-
"Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926).
"2Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596
(1919); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Schulte v.
Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269
Pac. 660 (1928); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938);
Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (1944); Stone v.
Jones, 66 Cal. App. 2d 264, 152 P. 2d 19 (1944); see White v. White, 108
W.Va. 128, 130, 150 S.E. 531, 532 (1929); Martin, Segregation of Residences
of Negroes, 32 Mic. L. REv. 721 (1934); Notes,-42 MicH. L. REv. 923 (1944),
40 ILL. L. RLv. 432 (1946); 5 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, §1345 (3d ed. 1939).
Contra. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892).
3Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F. 2d 23 (App. D.C. 1942); Clark v.
Vaughn, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930); Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo.
166, 44 S.W. 2d 857 (1931); Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. 2d 496
(1932); Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P. 2d 260 (1944); Notes, 7 U.
or CH . L. REv. 710 (1940), 40 ILL. L. REV. 432 (1946).
1"Queensborough Land Co. v. Caseaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915);
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918); Wyatt v. Adair, 215
Ala. 363, 110 So. 801 (1926); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822
(1930); Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E. 2d 37 (1939); Lyons v.'Wallen,
191 Okla. 567, 133 P. 2d 555 (1942); Note, 12 Mo. L. Rev. 221 (1947).
'5 Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596
(1919); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v.
White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929); 2 SnVrEs, FuTuRE INTERFsTs,
§459 (1936); Siegel, Real Property Law and Mass Housing Needs, 12 Law
& CONTEMP. PROB. 30, 45 (1947). Since the practical effect of either type of
restriction is to exclude unwanted groups, the distinction is unwarranted.
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The principle was reaffirmed in Chicago, Burling-
ton and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); and in Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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cent decisions by the United States Supreme Court.'7 That racial re-
strictions ultimately attain their objectives through court enforce-
ment is self-evident. Therefore, several writers have maintained
that state judicial enforcement of such individually created restric-
tive agreements is state action prohibited by the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 8
That the judiciary should be reluctant to pioneer in disturbing
the status quo is understandable, for the situation is a delicate one.
But the enforcement of racial restrictions was of the courts' own
choosing, for post-Civil War decisions by the United States Supreme
Court 19 contained language broad enough to justify refusal by state
tribunals of judicial sanction of these devices violative of the spirit
of the Amendment, and these precedents were not followed. Nor are
statements20 such as those quoted in the opinion in the Perkins
case2l helpful when analysis of the problem is attempted. The issue
is not whether courts should abolish the distinctions which some
citizens do draw on account of racial differences but whether, once
distinctions have been drawn by individuals, the state judiciary
should give its manifest approval of racial barriers by granting the
equity injunction where the pressure of population has forced
initial encroachment upon areas subject to racial restrictions.
A forthright recognition of the issue distinguishes the recent
1' Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, (1930); Powell v. Ala-
bama 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl,
315 U.S. 769 (1942).
18 Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Recon-
sideration of the Problem, 12 U. or. CHL L. REv. 198 (1945); McGovney,
Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive
Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 Calif.
L. REv. 5 (1945); Notes, 21 IND. L. J. 223 (1946); 40 ILL. L. REV. 432 (1946).
For another view, see Huston, State Court Enforcement of Race Restrictive
Covenants as State Action Within Scope of Fourteenth Amendment, 45
MicH. L. REV. 733 (1947), wherein the opinion is expressed that invalidation
of restrictive covenants as contrary to public policy would be a sounder
approach to the law. A Note, 13 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 477 (1946), questions
the advisability of using the courts as a forum in which to thrash out this
essentially sociological problem.
19 See Note 16 supra.
20 "The law is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish dis-
tinctions which some citizens do draw on account of racial differences in re-
lation to their matter of purely private concern. For the law to attempt
to abolish these distinctions in the private dealings between individual§
would only serve to accentuate the difficulties which the situation presents."
79 Ohio. App. 457, 466, 70 N.E. 2d 487, 492 (1946) quoting from Parmalee v.
Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 628, 188 N.W. 330, 331 (1922).
2179 Ohio App. 457, 70 N.E. 2d 487 (1946), appeal dismissed, 72 N.E.




opinion of Chief Justice Vinpon holding that state judicial enforce-
ment of restrictive agreements directed at Negroes is an unconstitu-
tional denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws. 2 As
succinctly stated by appellate Justice Edgerton, who dissented
in Mays v. Burgess 23 and in Hurd v. Hodge,24 "Restrictive covenants
are not self-executing."-' That what the state legislature is pro-
hibited from achieving openly should be accomplished through mdi-
vidually created but judicially enforced constrictions was a reflec-
tion upon the judicial system of the nation. In companion cases26
the Supreme Court, speaking again through the Chief Justice, held
that judicial enforcements of racial restrictions is improper when
undertaken by federal courts, for such enforcement is a denial of
rights intended by Congress to be protected by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and is contrary to the public policy of the United States.
Therefore, as a result of these decisions, judicial sanction of a dis-
crimiatory device, the use of which has subjected the nation to
criticism both'at home and abroad, has finally been withdrawn.
Robert J Lynn
Enforcement of Submission Agreements
The significance of the enforceability of voluntary industrial
arbitration agreements becomes apparent when one realizes the
widespread usage of arbitration clauses in industry-union collective
bargaining agreements. Conservative appraisals have shown that
three out of every four of the collectively bargained contracts opera-
tive today between labor and management contain some proviso
for the prospective arbitration of grievances and complaints. "In
recent years the prevailing pattern has made practically automatic
the acceptance of arbitration upon entering into contractual rela-
tions with a union."', "In the battle-scarred field of labor-manage-
ment relations, where practically every issue is bitterly contro-
versial, the principle of voluntary arbitration stands almost alone
2_Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 4426 (U.S.
May 4, 1948)
23 147 F 2d 869, 873 (App. D.C. 1945)
24r 162 F 2d 233, 235 (App. D.C. 1947) This opinion is especially notable
for its discussion of the public policy argument.25 Supra note 24, at 239.
2 6 Hurd v Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 16 U.S.L. Week 4432 (U.S. May
4, 1948)
i NATIONAL FOREMEN'S INSTITUTE INc., PITFALLS To AvoiD IN LABOR
ARBITRATION 1 (1947)
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